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The author delights in the pure integrity
and patriotism of his protagonists. Nonetheless, Bradley’s anecdotal evidence
makes a strong case that the principal
source of battlefield bravery has little to
do with national allegiance—it’s your
buddies who count. He wrestles with the
term “heroes”—a title of honor strenuously rejected by all the flag raisers.
There is little doubt, however, where the
author places these men who stood atop
Suribachi, beneath their flag.
TOM FEDYSZYN

Naval War College

Jablonsky, David, ed. Roots of Strategy, Book 4
(Four Military Classics). Mechanicsburg, Penna.:
Stackpole Books, 1999. 533pp. $19.95

In this useful fourth installment of
Stackpole’s “Roots of Strategy” series,
David Jablonsky of the Army War College presents substantial selections from
four classics of strategy: The Influence of
Sea Power upon History, by Alfred Thayer
Mahan; Some Principles of Maritime
Strategy, by Julian S. Corbett; The Command of the Air, by Giulio Douhet; and
Winged Defense, by William Mitchell.
The editor provocatively pairs American
authors with non-Americans writing on
the same subjects and bonds them with
two unifying arguments. Jablonsky contends that all four writers were coping
with monumental technological changes
in warfare and were struggling to reconcile continuity with change, while peering into the future.
The two naval theorists, Mahan of the
United States and Corbett of Great Britain, sought inspiration and guidance for
future warfare in the putatively unchanging principles of the age of sail. The
airpower innovators, Brigadier General
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Mitchell of the U.S. Army and Brigadier
General Douhet of Italy, concluded that
the heavy bomber rendered the study of
past warfare antiquarian and irrelevant to
those planning for future combat.
As an American born in 1879 (one year
before Douglas MacArthur and eleven
years before the “closing of the frontier”),
“Billy” Mitchell remained convinced that
the vastness of the Atlantic and Pacific
Oceans gave the United States a security
from land invasion unique among great
powers. In the editor’s opinion, Mitchell
consequently was slow to confront
Douhet’s truly horrifying prescription for
mass bombing of cities to pulverize “the
material and moral resources of a people” in order to achieve “the final collapse of all social organization.” For most
of his contentious career, Mitchell envisioned large land-based American bombers primarily as instruments for sinking
enemy warships advancing toward the
American coastline, with fighter aircraft
indispensable for downing long-range
bombers headed for inland U.S. cities,
which were now “as subject to attack as
those along the coast.”
Defense also plays a large role in Sir
Julian Corbett’s 1911 masterwork, Some
Principles of Maritime Strategy, the distillation of a lifetime of careful reflection
upon the age of fighting sail from Drake
to Nelson. A lawyer by training and a minor novelist by avocation, Corbett is the
only author in this volume who never
served in the military. He was, however,
an intimate of Admiral Sir John Fisher,
who presided over the dawn of the age of
the dreadnought.
Some Principles of Maritime Strategy
shows a linguist’s familiarity with the figure considered today the Zeus of strategic
thinkers, Carl von Clausewitz. It contains
the best short summary of Clausewitz’s
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principal ideas currently in print in the
United States. Equally riveting to anyone
formulating realistic strategy is Corbett’s
disenchantment with supposedly “decisive” grand battles, his concept of geographically shifting and limited command
of the seas, and his praise for interservice
cooperation and amphibious operations.
He was the first English-speaking writer
indissolubly to link the military-naval,
diplomatic, and economic elements of
strategy.
As Jablonsky notes, Captain A. T. Mahan’s
scope is narrower than Corbett’s. The
American naval officer was writing in
1890 to further the technological and
strategic revolution unleashed by the recent advent of the steam-driven, heavily
gunned, thickly armored battleship.
Jablonsky reprints only the first sections
of Mahan’s opus, those in which Mahan
makes his “political-economic argument
for sea power.” The editor has omitted
entirely the great bulk of the book, the
thirteen historical chapters concerning
both grand strategy and “the art and
science of command,” as derived from
Anglo-French naval battles in the age of
square-rigged ships of the line. This is a
regrettable exclusion, because Jablonsky
has adopted and emphasized the imaginative thesis of Jon Tetsuro Sumida that
Mahan was as interested in “teaching
command” as in the strategy of sea power.
The limited excerpt from The Influence of
Sea Power is insufficient to permit the
reader to judge the validity of Sumida’s
proposition or to assess the utility of
Mahan’s ponderous dissections of sea
battles, which were fought with a technology that had already disappeared when the
naval officer wrote more than a century ago.
Half a loaf is nonetheless better than
none, and Jablonsky’s balanced arrangement of Corbett, Douhet, and Mitchell
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alongside Mahan should earn this volume
a place on the bookshelves of all students
of strategy who are sated with the current
deification of Clausewitz and Sun Tzu.
KENNETH J. HAGAN

Adjunct Professor of Strategy
Naval War College

Smith, Gene A. Thomas ap Catesby Jones: Commodore of Manifest Destiny. Annapolis, Md.: Naval
Institute Press, 2000. 223pp. $34.95

Thomas ap Catesby Jones is best known
for his mistaken seizure of Monterey,
California, on 20 October 1842, believing
that the United States and Mexico had
gone to war. The occupation lasted
barely overnight before the American flag
had to be ceremoniously lowered and the
Mexican flag rehoisted. Locally, the event
was an occasion for many banquets and
dances, but on the national level more serious repercussions caused a crisis in relations between Mexico and the United
States.
Living in Monterey, I had often wondered about this incident, which is mentioned only briefly as a footnote in local
histories. Now, with this biography of
Thomas ap Catesby Jones, I have a much
better understanding of a colorful part of
Monterey history.
But this book offers much more. It explores the life of a controversial and
complicated man whose naval career
lasted half a century, from 1805 to 1855.
In this period the United States went
through a transformation from a young
coastal nation on the Atlantic seaboard to
a power that spanned the continent, a
nation pursuing a “Manifest Destiny,”
with interests stretching well beyond its
borders.
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